

Message Text

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TAGS: RO, US, OREP (MCGOVERN, GEORGE), PEPR, KN
SUBJECT: SENATOR MCGOVERN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
CEAUSESCU

1. SUMMARY: DURING 80 MINUTE JULY 13 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT NICOLAE CEAUSESCU AT NEPTUNE, ROMANIAN LEADER'S BLACK SEA RESIDENCE, SENATOR GEORGE MCGOVERN HAD COMPREHENSIVE DIALOGUE WITH CEAUSESCU ON THE MIDDLE EAST, EUROPEAN SECURITY, DIS-ARMAMENT, ROMANIAN AND U. S. RELATIONS WITH ASIAN STATES, AND AGRICULTURAL POLICIES. GOR FOREIGN MINISTER STEFAN ANDREI AND AMBASSADOR AGGREY WERE PRESENT. END SUMMARY.

2. SENATOR MCGOVERN THANKED PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU FOR THE HOSPITALITY HE HAD RECEIVED IN ROMANIA. HE FOUND NEPTUNE BEACH MORE AGREEABLE THAN THAT AT YALTA, AND ASKED HOW MANY DAYS THE PRESIDENT SPENT EACH YEAR AT NEPTUNE. CEAUSESCU ANSWERED: "ABOUT 30". HE WELCOMED MCGOVERN AT A MOMENT WHEN, HE SAID, THE U.S. AND ROMANIA FACED THE IMPORTANT CHALLENGES OF REALIZING THE OBJECTIVES AGREED UPON DURING THE ROMANIAN CHIEF OF STATE'S APRIL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. THE TALKS WITH CARTER LED HIM TO A NUMBER OF UNDERSTANDINGS AND HE SAW NO REAL IMPEDIMENTS TO CLOSER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. IN LINE WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION AND JOINT COMMUNIQUE THEY ADOPTED.

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3. SENATOR MCGOVERN MENTIONED HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR KREISKY, A FEW DAYS EARLIER, FOLLOWING THE VIENNA MEETING BETWEEN EGYPT'S PRESIDENT SADAT AND ISRAEL'S OPPOSITION LEADER SIMON PERES. HE MENTIONED HIS TALKS EARLIER THAT DAY WITH ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI AND ASKED CEAUSESCU WHAT WAS REQUIRED TO GET MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS RESUMED AND TO REACH SOME SORT OF SETTLEMENT. CEAUSESCU

REPLIED THAT HE HAD KEPT MCGOVERN WAITING ONLY BECAUSE HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH A SYRIAN PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION JUST BEFORE HAD BEEN DIFFICULT. THE SYRIANS WERE STILL OUTRAGED AT SADAT FOR HIS INITIATIVE WITH ISRAEL. THAT ATTITUDE WAS PART OF A PROBLEM NOW SO COMPLEX THAT UNLESS SOME PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED RAPIDLY THE TENSION IN THE REGION COULD LEAD TO NEW CRISES. WHILE SADAT HAD MADE EVERY EFFORT TOWARD PEACE, BEGIN SEEMED TO MOVE ISRAEL'S POSITION BACKWARDS FROM ITS ORIGINAL PLEDGE. UNLESS ISRAEL'S RESPONSES TO SADAT ARE MORE POSITIVE, AND SOME SOLUTION REACHED FOR THE PALESTINIANS, PEACE WILL NOT COME. U.S. SHOULD CONTINUE TO FULFILL THE IMPORTANT RESPONSIBILITY IT HAS IN THE REGION IN LINE WITH THE AID IT GIVES ISRAEL. SADAT'S FAILURE WOULD SERIOUSLY AFFECT THE U.S.

4. IN RESPONSE TO MCGOVERN'S QUESTION AS TO THE MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DEALING WITH THE PALESTINE ISSUE, CEAUSESCU SAW TWO. FIRST, ISRAEL SHOULD BEGIN DIRECT TALKS WITH THE PALESTINIANS, SINCE NO ONE COULD REALLY DETERMINE FOR THEM WHAT CONCESSIONS THEY WILL ACCEPT. SECOND, SELF-DETERMINATION MUST BE ADMITTED INCLUDING PALESTINIAN OCCUPATION OF GAZA AND THE WEST BANK. THESE TWO MOVES WOULD NEED ENCOURAGEMENT BY THE OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES AND THE UN, BUT NO AGREEMENT IN WHICH THE PALESTINIANS DID NOT PARTICIPATE WOULD HAVE ANY LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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SIGNIFICANCE. SADAT'S MOST RECENT PROPOSALS DESERVED THE GREATEST POSSIBLE ATTENTION. ANSWERING A SECOND MCGOVERN QUESTION, CEAUSESCU SAID HE THOUGHT ISRAEL'S LABOR PARTY LEADERS, RABIN, ET AL., WOULD HAVE BETTER RAPPORT WITH SADAT.

5. TURNING TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS, CEAUSESCU SAID INTENSIFICATION OF SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, MOST RECENTLY IN AFRICA, WAS AN UNHAPPY DEVELOPMENT. BELGRADE CSCE CONFERENCE WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OF THAT INTENSIFICATION. WHILE ROMANIA UNDERSTOOD THE LEADERSHIP ROLES U.S. AND USSR MUST PLAY, THE TWO POWERS COULD NOT SOLVE ALL PROBLEMS -- "ABOVE THE HEADS" OF OTHER STATES AND PEOPLES. NEW BALANCE OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES MADE SUCH A PROCEDURE UNWORKABLE. THE CLEARLY EXPRESSED POLICY SUPPORTING EQUALITY OF RIGHTS, INDEPENDENCE, AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES, REGISTERED IN THE CARTER-CEAUSESCU JOINT DECLARATION, CONTAINED PRINCIPLES ALL NATIONS SHOULD OBSERVE, ESPECIALLY THE USSR AND THE U.S. A SALT AGREEMENT WHILE QUITE SIGNIFICANT WOULD NOT RESOLVE ALL DISARMAMENT ISSUES. CEAUSESCU SAID HE PERCEIVED A CONCERN FOR

EQUILIBRIUM BASED ON A POLICY OF STRENGTH, BUT TO
MOVE TOWARD DETENTE REQUIRED FIRST AN END TO THE NUCLEAR
ARMS RACE AND THEN AN END TO PRODUCTION OF MASS DESTRUCTION
WEAPONS. ONLY RESOLUTE MEASURES TOWARD THAT END COULD
STOP NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. SENATOR MCGOVERN REMINDED
PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU THAT THE U.S. LAST MARCH IN MOSCOW
PROPOSED A GENERAL MUTUAL ARMS REDUCTION WHICH THE
SOVIETS OPPOSED AND WONDERED WHETHER SOVIETS WERE NOW
MORE RECEPTIVE OR WHETHER LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE RAISED.

6. CEAUSESCU DOUBTED THAT EITHER U.S. OR SOVIETS WERE
PRESENTLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT SUBSTANTIAL ARMS REDUCTION
BUT HE FLT A STOPPAGE OF THE ARMS RACE -- AN AGREEMENT TO
HALT PRODUCTION OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS -- MIGHT BE
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POSSIBLE. HE WAS ENCOURAGED BY FRANCE AND CHINA'S
PARTICIPATION IN THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

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AND HE FELT MAXIMUM DISARMAMENT EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE
NOW. ADOPTION OF THE REDUCTIONS CURRENTLY PROPOSED IN
THE VIENNA MBFR TALKS WOULDN'T REALLY CHANGE EQUILIBRIUM
BUT IT WOULD REPRESENT A POLITICAL, CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
ACT.

7. MCGOVERN INQUIRED WHETHER REASHING A SALT AGREEMENT
THIS YEAR WOULD BE CONSIDRED USEFUL BY ROMANIA, EVEN IF
IN THE THE U.S. IT WERE TO OPEN LONG SENATE DEBATE ON

RATIFICATION CARRYING OVER INTO NEXT YEAR. CEAUSESCU PREFERRED AN AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT WOULD BE A POSITIVE STEP IN GENERAL EFFORT TO MOVE FORWARD. DEBATES WOULD NOT BE DISADVANTAGE IF RATIFICATION CAME LATER, AS TO ELECTION YEAR CONSIDERATIONS, HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT A SALT AGREEMENT WOULD BE AN ASSET FOR DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES. IN ANY EVENT A FEW MONTHS' DELAY WAS NOT SIGNIFICANT. CEAUSESCU SAID HE HOPED U.S. AND USSER WOULD COME TO POSITION OF A FIRM PLEDGE NOT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST AND ESPECIALLY NOT AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR STATES.

8. MCGOVERN TOLD CEAUSESCU HE FLT ROMANIA'S PROPOSAL AT SSOD DESERVED MUCH MORE ATTENTION THAT IT RECEIVED. CEAUSESCU SAID HE WAS NOT DISAPPOINTED BY THE RECEPTION AND THAT MANY OF THE PROPOSAL'S ELEMENTS ARE NOW IN DOCUMENTS ADOPTED BY THE SSOD. OTHERS ARE IN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION. SSOD DID NOT AIM AT CONCRETE MEASURES FOR DISARMAMENT. AS IT PROVIDED FOR A PRESENTATION OF VARIOUS STATES' POSITIONS ON DISARMAMENT IN A NEW, MORE DEMOCRATIC FRAMEWORK OF ACTIVITY, THE SESSION HAD POSITIVE RESULTS AND OPENED A NEW ERA. ALL STATES MUST BE RESPONSIVE TO PUBLIC OPINION AT HOME AND/OR ABROAD IN ESTABLISHING DISARMEMENT POLICY. WHEN NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE BEHIND CLOSED DOORS IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHAT OTHERS ARE THINKING.

9. TURNING TO RELATIONS WITH ASIAN STATES, MCGOVERN ASKED FOR CEAUSESCU'S COMMENTS ON HIS MAY VISIT TO A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES WHERE THE U.S. HAS NO OR ONLY LIMITED REPRESENTATION: CEAUSESCU DESCRIBED THE VISIT TO PEKING AS A SUCCESS, NOTING THAT CHINESE PREMIER HUA KUO-FENG WILL VISIT ROMANIA IN AUGUST.

10. EARLIER THAT DAY, CEAUSESCU SAID, HE HAD RECEIVED NORTH KOREAN PRESIDENT KIM IL-SUNG'S REPRESENTATIVE. DURING HIS VISIT TO NORTH KOREA, HE OBSERVED THE DPRK'S REMARKABLE PROGRESS. ROMANIA'S RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA REMAINED VERY GOOD AND DURING THE VISIT KIM WAS CLEARLY PREOCCUPIED WITH QUESTIONS OF PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. CEAUSESCU SAID HE FLT KIM'S POSITION WAS JUST AND OPENED REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR AN AGREEMENT. DPRK WISHED TO TALK WITH, AND DESIRED RELATIONS WITH, THE U.S. PROBLEM REMAINED IT CONDITION OF A MEASURE OF "DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH, LEGALIZING THE ACTIVITIES OF POLITICAL PARTIES." ON THE OTHER HAND, POLITICAL FORCES IN THE SOUTH APPEARED MORE EXIGENT ON CONDITIONS FOR TALKS. CEAUSESCU SAID ADOPTION OF CERTAIN DEMOCRATIC MEASURES

WOULD OPEN UP PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH AS WELL AS U.S. IN RESPONSE TO MCGOVERN'S QUESTIONS, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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CEAUSESCU SAID HE FELT ARRANGING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE DPRK AND PARK WOULD BE DIFFICULT BUT NOT IMPOSSIBLE; THAT HE FULLY APPRECIATED THE U.S. POSITION OF NOT NEGOTIATING WITH THE DPRK UNLESS THE ROK PARTICIPATED; AND THAT HE FELT THE U.S. COULD ENCOURAGE THE ADOPTION OF THE POLITICAL CHANGES IN THE ROK WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

11. MCGOVERN RECALLED HIS POSITION AGAINST U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIET-NAM WAR AND CITED THE REPORTS OF MASS KILLINGS IN CAMBODIA. CEAUSESCU SAID VIET-NAM VERY MUCH WISHED TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND HE FELT U.S. INITIATIVES WOULD BE CERTAIN OF GOOD RESULTS ON MISSING-IN-ACTION, ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL MATTERS. THE ACT OF NEGOTIATING US-VIETNAM AGREEMENT WOULD AUGUR WELL FOR PEACE IN THE GENERAL AREA. ON CAMBODIA, CEAUSESCU SAID HE FELT THE REPORTS OF MASSING KILLINGS WERE EXAGGERATED. HOWEVER, HE HAD NOT VISITED MANY LOCALITIES OF CAMBODIA. CAMBODIA HAD ADOPTED RADICAL MEASURES TO SOLVE ITS FOOD PROBLEM, AND WITH GOOD RESULTS SINCE THE COUNTRY HAD AGAIN BECOME A RICE EXPORTER.

12. WHEN MCGOVERN ASKED WHETHER GOOD AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE "FROM THE OUTSIDE" FOR VIET-NAM AND CAMBODIA WOULD BE ACCEPTED, CEAUSESCU SAID YES, BUT VIET-NAM WANTED MORE THAN THAT, A BROADER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

13. RETURNING TO BILATERAL RELATIONS, MCGOVERN SAID U.S. EXPECTED A BUMPER FEED GRAIN CROP THIS YEAR AND WONDERED WHETHER ROMANIA DESIRED ADDITIONAL PURCHASES IN 1978-79. CEAUSESCU SAID ROMANIA WISHED TO LIMIT ITS AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS ESSENTIALLY TO FEED GRAINS, PROTEINS AND COTTON. HE EXPECTED A GOOD WHEAT AND CORN CROP THIS YEAR BUT EXPECTED TO IMPORT FEED FOR PORK AND OTHER ANIMAL PRODUCTION FROM THE U.S. LONG-TERM EMPHASIS HOWEVER WOULD BE IMPORTATION OF AGRICULTURAL TECHNOLOGY.

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14. CONCLUDING, CEAUSESCU SAID IN GENERAL ROMANIA SOUGHT GREATER TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. AND NOW RECOGNIZED U.S. SYSTEM REQUIRED CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT IN SUCH ENDEAVOR IN ORDER TO REALIZE OBJECTIVE

OF JOINT DECLARATION OF APRIL 13, 1978. ALSO ROMANIA WISHED TO SEE EUROPEAN SECURITY DEVELOPED BUT NOT THROUGH THE FIRING UP OF THE TWO BLOCS, RATHER BY THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ALL STATES CONCERNED BASED UPON EQUALITY. U.S. AS SIGNATORY TO THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT SHOULD ACT TOWRD THIS END. THERE IS NO NEED TO STRENGTHEN EITHER NATO OR THE WARSAW PACT. WHILE REALISTICALLY THESE BLOCS CANNOT BE DISSOLVED OVERNIGHT, COMMON ACTION AND SOUND DISARMAMENT MEASURES WOULD DIMINISH THE ROLE AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF BLOCS.

15. CEAUSESCU TOLD MCGOVERN HIS VISIT TO ROMANIA AND THEIR CONVERSATIONS WERE IMPORTANT BECAUSE OF THE SENATOR'S ROLE AND INFLUENCE IN U.S. GOVERNMENT AND LIFE AND THAT HE HOPED HE WOULD WORK TO STRENGTHEN ROMANIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. MCGOVERN THANKED CEAUSESCU FOR GIVING HIM SO MUCH OF HIS TIME ON A BUSY AFTERNOON. HE SAID HE ADMIRED CEAUSESCU'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN AFFIRMING ROMANIA'S UNITY AND INDEPENDENCE AND IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE. HE WOULD WORK TO STRENGTHEN BILATERAL RELATIONS.

16. PLEASE PASS COPY OF THIS TELEGRAM TO SENATOR MCGOVERN'S OFFICE, ATTENTION JOHN HOLUM. DECONTROL UPON RECEIPT.
AGGREY

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